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(ii prevention: This refers to the condemned, who, once executed, cannot again kill. This conclusion is indisputable.
(iii) deterrent: Whether the fear of the death penalty actually
deters others from committing murder has been debated for
decades. Experts have not concurred as to the deterrent effect
of capital statutes.
(iv) *(He "got what he deserved": Retribution seems to be
underlying rationale for those who favor retention of capital
punishment. Many refer to the Old Testament as confirming
this position: "...life for2 3' life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand
for hand, foot for foot.
Against
(i)costs: Somewhat peculiarly, both advocates and opponents
list cost as a supportive factor. Opponents refer to the substantial
costs of the necessary protracted appeals process (court costs
and time, public financial responsibility for defense attorney
fees, for example). A life penalty would avoid such expenses.
(ii) execution after an incorrect judgment is irreversible: This
statement is not subject to argument. However, one should
remember the difference between the terms "innocent" and
"not guilty." The former would mean that the defendant actually had not committed the crime of which he was convicted,
whereas the latter, that whether he actually committed the
crime, he had not been proven guilty under the law. Most of
those few instances where an inmate has been pardoned or
granted a new trial while on death row refer to the "not guilty"
category.
23 Exodus 21: 23-24. However, Biblical mandates are neither material nor
probative as evidence in American courts because of the First Amendment
prohibition of governmental establishment of religion.
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(iii) Capital punishment judgments are imposed disproportionately against blacks and the poor: This argument has been
tried
24
and failed. The Supreme Court has refuted its relevance.
(iv) *such punishment is fundamentally wrong and immoral:
Most opponents of capital punishment concede that this ground
is the persuasive one for them. Many also cite the Old Testament as substantiating their position: "Thou shalt not kill."25

IV. Conclusion
During the last three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has
handed down a host of opinions on state capital punishment
statutes. Significantly, the Court has never held the death penalty itself to be "cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore
unconstitutional."
Perhaps the most compelling reversals have been the Court's
overrulings of its prior positions regarding minors and retarded
persons. In the early years of this century, the Court narrowly
held executions of persons under age 18 and/or the mentally
retarded when the crime as committed to be unconstitutional.
The greater percentage of blacks sentenced to death continues
to be judicially regarded as merely a coincidence. Additionally, legal challenges to each of the five currently used methods
of execution have failed.
Meanwhile, the death
penalty remains alive and well in "the
26
land of the free.
24 McCleskev v. Kemp, supra n. 19.
25 This is one of the Ten Commandments. Deuteronomy 5:17. But see supra
n. 23.
26 The author recommends the following website (Washington, D.C.) for
up-to-date information on the death penalty in the United States: www.
deathpenalty.org
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Punitive Damages in the United States
In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore bought a new BMW 535i for about
$40,000 from a dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. He soon became dissatisfied with its appearance, and when he took it to
"Slick Finish," an automobile detailer, he learned that the car
had been repainted before he bought it. Dr. Gore then found
out that BMW of North America had a policy of repainting
damaged new cars without informing either the dealer or the
ultimate purchase. Dr. Gore then did what any red blooded
American would do, he sued BMW, asking for $500,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages and costs. While that may
seem like a lot of money for a relatively benign economic injury, the Alabama jury went one better and awarded Dr. Gore
compensatory damages of $4000, representing the difference
in value between a non-repainted new BMW and the repainted
BMW sold to Dr. Gore, and S4 million in punitive damages,
apparently representing $4000 for each of the 1000 cars that
BMW had repainted and sold as new. The Supreme Court of
Alabama reduced the award to the still substantial sum of $2
million, but ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme
Court on the ground that even the lower $2 million award was
unconstitutionally high.i The U.S. Supreme Court left it to the
*

I

Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University
School of Law.
BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

Alabama court to determine an appropriate, albeit much lower,
amount.
The Gore case illustrates the current debate in the United
States over punitive damages. In civil cases, the compensatory
damages remedy fully compensates the plaintiff for his injuries. In the United States, however, an additional remedy, punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages and "smart
money," is sometimes available above and beyond compensatory damages, to punish the defendant and deter similar conduct. Punitive damages have become controversial in recent
years, mainly because of high awards in cases that have been
subject to criticism in the media, such as a near $3 million
award to a woman who spilled hot coffee on herself at a
McDonald's restaurant and the $4 million Dr. Gore almost got
over his repainted BMW.
This article is an attempt to acquaint the reader with contemporary legal issues surrounding punitive damages in the United States. Pursuant to U.S. federalism, most private law in the
United States is state law and can vary significantly from state
to state. Contract law, tort (injury) law, property law and criminal law are mainly state law. Many of these areas are governed
largely by common law which means that there are no statutes,
and courts make the law in the course of resolving individual
legal controversies. It is the state common law of injury that
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allows punitive damages in the United States. Thus, most of
the law that is discussed in this article is made by state judges
in the absence of governing statutes.
Origins of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages originated in the common law of England,
which was adopted by each of the states when they became
independent or came into existence. In England, the common
law courts asserted the power to award punitive damages in the
eighteenth century, mainly as a supplement to an underdeveloped criminal law system? While most U.S. states followed this
common law, some states, including Massachusetts, have ruled
against punitive damages, holding that punitive damages are
available only when specified by the legislature in a statute.'
Punitive Damages Basics
In most states, punitive damages may be awarded on a showing that the defendant acted with malice toward the defendant,
which means that the defendant acted either with a bad intent
toward the plaintiff or that the defendant consciously disregarded a known risk of injury to the plaintiff. This standard
is sometimes referred to as "willful and wanton misconduct."
The defendant's conduct must involve aggravating factors
above and beyond ordinary negligence. In a minority of states,
proof of bad intent may be required before punitive damages
are awarded, but the predominant view is that it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to show that the defendant knowingly disregarded a known risk of harm to the plaintiff.
Unlike compensatory damages, a plaintiff is never entitled to
punitive damages. Even if the legal requirements for a punitive award are met, it is not legal error for a jury to refuse to
award them. If the judge decides that the plaintiff's evidence,
if believed, meets the standard for an award of punitive damages, the judge will instruct the jury that in addition to compensatory damages, it may award punitive damages if it finds
that the facts establish that the legal standard has been satisfied
and if the jury finds that an award is justified by the goals of
punishment and deterrence. The jury may also be told that this
is an essentially moral judgment in the discretion of the jury.
The judge will not require the jury to make a punitive award
under any circumstances. By contrast, if a jury fails to award
compensatory damages when the evidence conclusively establishes that they should be awarded, the judge will either award
them himself or order a new trial.
In order for a punitive award to punish and deter, it must be
large enough to make a difference to the defendant. This means
that the jury will often be told something about the wealth of
the defendant. When the defendant is a large corporation or
wealthy individual, plaintiffs are happy to be able to introduce
evidence of the defendant's wealth. This can lead to very large
punitive awards, as juries make multi-million dollar awards
against defendants with assets in the hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars.
If the jury does make an award, the judge has the power to
reduce if it is excessive. While there are certain guidelines that
judges apply to determine whether an award is excessive, the
inquiry is seriously lacking in precision (as is the jury's initial
decision about how much to award). The judge will consider
such factors as the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, whether
2

3

See Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 ( 7 "
Cir. 2003) citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., "Fairness and Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1982).
This was stated by the great judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, in Burt v
AdvertiserNewspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891).
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the defendant's misconduct is widespread and ongoing, the size
of punitive awards in similar cases, the relationship between
the compensatory and punitive awards and the relationship
between available criminal and civil penalties and the punitive
award. On the latter factors, the greater the difference the more
likely the judge will reduce the award.
Why punitive damages?
There have been several reasons offered in favor of allowing
punitive damages.4 Judge Richard Posner, a leading legal
scholar and proponent of the economic analysis of the law, has
explained the reasons as follows: 1) Compensatory damages
often do not fully compensate for injuries because in many
cases, such as harms to dignity, the damages are very uncertain. Also, compensatory damages do not include the costs of
litigation, mainly lawyers' fees, in the U.S. 2) If compensatory
damages do not fully compensate, socially harmful conduct
will be underdeterred. 3) Punitive damages channel transactions to the market where compensatory damages are not as
high as the gains to defendants. For example, if a defendant
has taken property worth $1 on the market that the defendant
values at $2, limiting the plaintiff to the compensatory remedy
of $1 would allow defendants to initiate involuntary transfers
of property whenever they place a higher value on the property than does the market. Punitive damages deter this sort of
involuntary transaction. 4) Punitive damages provide proper
deterrence in cases in which some percentage of defendants
are able to conceal their conduct or where some plaintiffs do
not bother to sue because the damages are too small. Ideally,
the damages would be increased by exactly the percentage of
compensatory damages that will never be awarded due to concealment or failure to sue. 5) Punitive damages allow the community to express disapproval of certain conduct. 6) Punitive
damages may relieve pressure on the criminal justice system
to pursue minor crimes. 7) Punitive damages may discourage
a breach of the peace by plaintiffs who want the defendant to
be punished when the criminal justice system would not act
because the crime is too minor in relation to others.
The arguments against punitive damages are many. The most
basic argument is that they may lead to overdeterrence of socially useful behavior especially when unguided juries make
very large awards. If a plaintiff is able to recover more than the
actual losses from tortious conduct, a defendant will have to
take the additional damages into account when deciding how to
behave and this will be inefficient. For example, if a machine
can be made safe only by adding $1000 to its cost, and the damages caused by the machine average out to $500 per machine,
it is socially inefficient to add the safety feature. However, if
plaintiffs can recover an additional $1500 in punitive damages
per machine, then the maker of the machine will be induced
to spend $500 per machine more than the actual damages
avoided. Another common argument against punitive damages
is that they are unpredictable and tend to reflect the whim of the
jury rather than any rational legal or economic analysis.
Examples of Punitive Damages Awards
Probably the most famous U.S. case involving punitive damages occurred when a woman sued McDonald's after she
spilled hot coffee on herself.5 Although people assume that she
4

5

t

See Kemezy v Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34-36 (7' Cir. 1996) (Posner J). Sec
also Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7
Cir. 2003) (Posner,J.); Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 20607 ( 7 1 ed. 2007).
Liebeck v. McDonald~v Restaurants.P TS., Inc., No. D-202 CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
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was driving her car when the spill occurred, she actually was
a passenger, and the car was not moving at the time. Further,
she suffered real bums requiring hospitalization and surgery.
Although in some states McDonald's would not even be liable
in such a case (mainly because hot coffee is not defective by
virtue of being hot6 ), a New Mexico jury found McDonald's
liable and awarded the plaintiff $160,000 in compensatory
damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages. The argument
.for punitive damages was that McDonald's purposely brewed
its coffee at a very high temperature and knew, based on numerous prior claims (700 in the previous ten years), that its
customers were likely to suffer serious bums if they spilled the
coffee on themselves, which was not an unlikely occurrence
since McDonald's served coffee at drive up windows and knew
that people drank the coffee in their cars. The jury wanted to
send McDonald's a message by awarding its coffee sales for
two days to the plaintiff. What is less widely known about the
case is that after the jury made its award, the judge found it
excessive and reduced it to $480,000 (three times compensatory damages). McDonald's appealed, and the elderly plaintiff,
apparently hoping to receive the award during her lifetime, is
reported to have settled for $80,000. There are also reports that
after the incident, the particular McDonald's reduced the temperature at which it serves its coffee.
The McDonald's case shows that juries, when confronted with
serious injuries and a widespread practice, sometimes make
very large punitive awards on top of relatively modest compensatory damages. It also illustrates how the legal system
has adapted to this, by empowering judges to reduce excessive awards. Finally, the misimpressions that most people have
about the case - that the plaintiff was driving, that she was not
seriously hurt, that she received $3 million - shows how sensational legal cases that are often misunderstood by the American public can fuel public debate.
The application of the "conscious disregard of a known risk"
standard for awarding punitive damages is illustrated by
another interesting case involving a butcher, a meat cutting
machine and a finger.7 The plaintiff was cutting meat when his
finger was cut off by the machine. He sued in an Illinois court,
alleging that the machine's design was defective. He offered
evidence that there had been 30 prior reported injuries with the
same model and that other butchers had complained that the
machine tended to pull their hands toward the cutting blades.
The plaintiff argued that because the maker of the machine
knew about the prior injuries, it had consciously disregarded
a known risk to people using the machine. The jury agreed
with the plaintiff and awarded him $553,000 in compensatory
damages and $20 million in punitive damages.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the award of punitive
damages on the ground that the proof was insufficient to establish malice. The Illinois court noted that the defendant had
sold 5816 such machines over a 10 year period. The court calculated that only .5% of that particular model had caused injuries and that an injury occurred in only .0000007% of the cuts
made. This exceedingly small frequency of injury, the court
concluded, was not sufficient to put the defendant on notice
that its machine was so dangerous that it was willful and wanton misconduct to keep it on the market. On this basis, the
court held that punitive damages were not available.

6
7

Holowaty v. MeDonalds Corp., 10 F. Supp.2d 1078 (D_ Minn. 1998) (applying Minnesota law).
Kopczick v. Hobart Corp., 308 111.App.3d 967, 721 N.E.2d 769 (IlL. App.
1989).
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Another case, involving a small car with an exploding gas
tank, illustrates the relationship between the standard for tort
liability and the standard for punitive damages. In the 1970s,
U.S. car makers struggled to produce small cars that were suddenly in demand after the first oil crisis. Ford Motor Company
produced the Pinto with a gas tank design that made it prone
to exploding when hit from the rear. In the U.S., we learn in
law school that the standard of care in a normal tort situation is
captured by the Hand formula (named for the famous 20th Century jurist Learned Hand) B<PL under which a person is expected to adopt any precaution (B) that is cost-effective (based
on the probability (P) times the likely loss (L)), and not adopt
a precaution that is not, i.e. when B>PL. For example, if a machine is 10 percent likely to cause S10 in damage, PL=$1, and
if a safety precaution would cost $2, it is not negligent for the
maker of the machine to fail to adopt the precaution. However,
if a precaution costing SI would save $2 in damages, then it is
negligent not to take the precaution.
Ford Motor Company calculated that the cost of a solution to
the Pinto's explosive gas tank (amounting to $12 per car across
millions of cars) was higher than the damages it would pay to
the victims (and survivors) of explosions. From the plaintiffs'
perspective, Ford was guilty of outrageous conduct in opting to
pay damages rather than save lives. From Ford's perspective,
it was merely following the law and deciding whether to take
precautions based on a cost-benefit analysis. The plaintiffs
were able to obtain a copy of a memorandum containing this
cost-benefit analysis, and based on that evidence, the California court hearing a case arising out of one of the many Pinto
explosions held that Ford had consciously disregarded a known
risk of serious injury or death, and thus could be held liable for
punitive damages.8 Because of a technicality in California law
at the time, survivors of the dead victims were not eligible for
punitive damages, so ajury award of $125 million in punitive
damages (on top of $2.5 million in compensatory damages)
was reduced by the court to $3.5 million.
The final case we will look at raises issues concerning the relevance of the defendant's wealth to the award of punitive damages and the relationship between punitive damages awards
and the criminal justice system. In one of the most celebrated
trials of the 2 0t" Century, former football player and actor O.J.
Simpson was charged, but acquitted, of the murder of his former wife and her friend. After the acquittal by the criminal
court, the families of the victims brought a civil suit against
Simpson. Thejury in that case found Simpson liable and awarded the plaintiffs $12.5 million in compensatory damages and
$25 million in punitive damages. 9 Simpson appealed, claiming that the award was too large and that the jury should not
have been allowed to consider evidence of his future earning
capacity. The California court rejected his appeal, holding that
his conduct (murder) was reprehensible and that evidence of
his future earning potential was appropriate to ensure that the
punitive award had its desired effect.
It might be asked how, after Simpson was acquitted by the
criminal court, can a civil jury punish him for a crime that according to the criminal system he did not commit? The answer
lies in the different standards of proof governing the two systems - a criminal conviction requires guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt while a civil award only requires a preponderance of the
evidence, i.e. that it be more likely than not that the defendant
committed the alleged conduct. A convicted defendant cannot
8

Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company, 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr

9

348 (1981).
Rufo v.Simpson, 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 (2001).
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contest his guilt in a civil court but an acquitted defendant can
In a series of cases going back only to 1996, the U.S. Supreme
be held civilly liable on a lower standard of proof.
Court has held that excessive punitive damages awards can
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Taken together, these cases provide a glimpse into the juristo the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from depriving
prudence of punitive damages. We see that while juries are
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
relatively unguided in the amount of punitive damages they
law. Constitutional interpretation at the U.S. Supreme Court is
award and often decide on very large awards, judges are ready,
rather creative, so that the very same clause that governs the
willing and able to step in and reduce them if they are excesright to abortion also governs the allowable size of punitive
sive or eliminate them altogether if the standard for an award is
damage awards.
not met. Further, we see that a company may run into trouble if
it explicitly compares the damages it is likely to pay to the cost
The first case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a punitive
of taking precautions, at least when serious personal injury is
damages award violated due process was the case involving
involved. Finally, we see that acquitted criminal defendants
the repainted BMW discussed above. ' In that case, the U.S.
may still be punished by the civil justice system.
Supreme Court stated that due process requires that courts
take into account the following three factors when evaluating
whether an award of punitive damages is unconstitutionally
Some Further Issues Raised By Punitive Awards
high: 1) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct (here
Punitive damages awards have been subjected to serious critithe conduct involved only economic loss and was not so bad);
cisms in recent years, especially in the context of what is perceiv2) the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages (here
ed as a litigious society with runaway juries making very large
the ratio was very high, about 500 to 1); and 3) the size of civil
awards of both compensatory and punitive damages. The tort
and criminal penalties that apply to the conduct (here the maxreformers in the U.S. have set their sights on punitive damages.
imum fine was much smaller than the award). The court made
One criticism is that the civil system should focus only on
a weak attempt to link its analysis to traditional due process
compensation and should leave punishment and deterrence
principles by arguing that a defendant would not have fair no(beyond the deterrence inherent in a compensatory award) to
tice that its conduct might subject it to punitive damages in exthe criminal system. On this view, it is thought unfair to subject
cess of what is allowed based on these three factors. Although
the court stated that these factors are required by due process,
a defendant to a civil punitive award that may be greater than
any criminal fine for the conduct especially when the standard
it should be noted that they are derived from the common law
of proof may be low and the juries are relatively unguided. The
of many states that apply them when deciding whether a partiunfairness is especially great in cases like the O.J. Simpson
cular punitive award is excessive. It's as if the Supreme Court
case in which the defendant has been exonerated in the crimifound the best common law and adopted it as a matter of connal system. But even if the defendant has been found guilty in
stitutional right.
the criminal system, punitive damages in a later civil suit look
More recently, the Supreme Court has decided two more cases,
like double jeopardy. Further, multiple civil courts in various
one involving the permissible ratio between punitive and comstates may hold the defendant liable for punitive damages for
pensatory damages, and the other involving what harm a court
the same conduct. The potential for unfairness to defendants in
may take into account when awarding punitive damages. In
punitive damages cases is very significant.
the first case, a Utah jury had awarded an insured $1 million
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Because a punitive award is in addition to full compensatory
damages, it has been argued that the punitive award should
go to the state or to other (uncompensated) victims of the
defendant's misconduct. The plaintiff has no need for the punitive damages and no moral claim to them. The problem is
that if punitive awards went to the state, plaintiffs would have
no incentive to seek them. If we believe in the justifications
for punitive damages discussed above, we would not want to
eliminate them, and a requirement that the award go to the
state would virtually assure that no plaintiff other than the state
would seek a punitive award.
States have responded to these criticisms with some moderate
reforms. In some states, the amount of punitive awards has
been limited either as an absolute amount or in some relation
to compensatory damages. Another reform has required that a
portion of the money awarded as punitive damages go to the
state, in recognition that the plaintiff has no real entitlement to
the money and that some of it should be used to compensate
other victims. However, the real action in punitive damages
awards has been at the U.S. Supreme Court level, which is
discussed next.
U.S. Supreme Court Punitive Damages Limitations
The Supreme Court of the United States, being a federal court,
has no jurisdiction to make changes to state common law.
Therefore, in order for a defendant to bring allegedly excessive
punitive awards to that court's attention, there must be a claimed violation of federal law, such as the federal constitution.

in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages in a case involving the State Farm insurance company's
failure to settle claims against its insured.i The ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages was a very 145:1, which
under the Gore case weighs in favor of finding a due process
violation. The Supreme Court focused on the ratio and held
that a punitive award of greater than nine times compensatory
damages is likely to be unconstitutional. This sort of mathematical precision is not traditionally thought of as within the
judicial role. The court also held that it was improper to allow
the jury to consider conduct by the defendant in other states
where it might not have been unlawful, and that under the Gore
factors, the $145 million award was excessive.
In the most recent case Supreme Court punitive damages
case, the court reviewed an Oregon court's punitive award of
$79.5 million (on top of about $1.5 million in compensatory damages) against the tobacco company Phillip Morris to
the family of a deceased smoker. In that case, the court held
that due process was violated because the jury was told that it
could consider harm to other smokers, not just the harm to the
plaintiff in the case.2 If the Supreme Court insists that juries
are not allowed to consider harm to others, this latest ruling is
likely to have far reaching effects and is inconsistent with one
of the bases for punitive damages, that they create the proper
incentives when other plaintiffs might not bring suit because
10 BMWof North America, Inc- v Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
11 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).
12 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
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the compensatory damages would be too small or because the
case might be too difficult to win.
In the State Farm case, the court held that most, but not necessarily all, punitive awards of greater than nine times compensatory damages were unconstitutional. The court recognized
that special circumstances might justify a higher ratio. In a
case in which special circumstances were found, Judge Posner, and the U.S. Court of Appeals on which he sits, upheld
an award of $186,000 on top of a compensatory award of only
$5000.13 (The case was in federal court because the parties
were from different states. In such cases state law applies and
in particular in this case the court was applying Illinois law.)
The case involved bed bugs in hotel rooms. The defendant apparently knew that its hotel was infested with bed bugs but did
not want to close the hotel temporarily to eliminate them. The
hotel would designate rooms as infested and post them as not
rentable, but then it would go ahead and rent them anyway.
The management also lied and told the guests that the bugs
were ticks, apparently believing people would be less repulsed
by ticks than by bed bugs. When a brother and sister who stayed in the hotel and were bitten by the bed bugs and sued, Judge
Posner held that the high punitive award, far above the nine
times compensatory ratio, was justified because while many
guests were bitten, few would sue for such small compensatory damages, the defendant was earning substantial profits
by concealing the harm, and the defendant litigated the case
very aggressively, apparently to discourage guests to sue for
such small compensatory damages. Because Judge Posner's
decision allowed the jury to take into account harm to guests
who did not sue, it probably violates the rule in the later Phillip
Morrisdecision.
Business interests have praised the Supreme Court for beginning a process of reining in excessive punitive damages
awards under state law. The Court is not, however, without
its critics who argue that the federal courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, have no business supervising state common
law remedies. To the critics, the Court is engaged in the same
h

13 Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7 Cir. 2003).
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sort of judicial activism that led to abortion on demand and
limits on school prayer, rulings that are general criticized by
conservatives who tend to favor judicially-imposed limits on
punitive damages.
The Future of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are under attack as part of a serious problem
of an overly litigious society. Excessive punitive awards along
with high compensatory awards are blamed for numerous social ills. Business interests complain that litigation costs are driving up the cost of doing business to the point of making socially desirable businesses unprofitable. Governments claim that
many recreational activities are no longer feasible because of
potential liability. Doctors claim to be living in a crisis caused
by high malpractice insurance premiums that may be due, in
part, to the potential for large punitive awards.
Calls for tort reform have resulted in some successes, although
legislative efforts to limit punitive and other damages have not
been very successful overall, as people seem to view efforts
to limit remedies as business interests acting against the little
guy. Perhaps the future of punitive damages is best illustrated
by what happened in Colorado in 1884. At that time, the Colorado Supreme Court decided that the common allowing punitive damages would not apply in that state.14 It viewed punitive
damages as totally illegitimate and invasive of the province of
the criminal law. That court characterized punitive damages as
inconsistent with fundamental legal principles and painted a
picture of a growing trend across the country of courts rejecting
punitive damages. Within five years, the Colorado legislature
overrode the court and reinstated punitive damages in Colorado15 and the court's purported anti-punitive damages trend
never materialized. Today, however, there is clearly pressure on
the size of punitive damage awards, and significant limitations
have been put in place at the U.S. Supreme Court level. Nevertheless, it appears that punitive damages will remain an element
of the U.S. legal system at least for some time to come.
14 Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119(1884).
15 Sec Colorado Sess. Laws 1889, p. 64.

